# Missionary Activity, Education, and Long-run Political Development: Evidence from Africa*

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**Abstract**

In Africa, missionaries used schooling to gain adherents. We study how historical missionary activity shaped long-run education and political development by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in exposure to Catholic missionaries generated by their territorial administration system. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that proximity to historical diocese headquarters led to an increased presence of Catholic missionaries, as well as long-term positive effects on Catholic identification and educational outcomes. In line with recent literature, the effects on political outcomes vary by regime type. Only individuals exposed to greater historical missionary activity in open anocracies—relative to those in democracies and closed anocracies—are more likely to participate in politics. Moreover, they are also the only ones that are more sophisticated, supportive of democratic institutions, and disenchanted with the state of democracy and incumbent in their countries.

**Keywords:** human capital; missions; political development

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# 1 Introduction

Education has long been considered "the great equalizer" among members of a society (Mann, 1848). It is considered not only a source of human capital, but also a catalyst and a prerequisite for democratic political participation and civic culture (*e.g.,* Almond and Verba, 2015; Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Deutsch, 1961). As countries develop and there are greater educational opportunities, citizens are expected to be better able to engage in politics both directly by casting an informed vote and indirectly by participating in their flourishing civil society (*e.g.,* Huntington, 2006; Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007; Lipset, 1959).

Yet, despite some initial empirical support for the positive effect of education on political engagement (Apfeld et al., 2022; Dee, 2004; Kam and Palmer, 2008; Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos, 2004), recent work challenges the causal role that education, and its associated higher socioeconomic status levels, plays in political attitudes and participation in developed democracies (Berinsky and Lenz, 2011; Marshall, 2016).[1] Moreover, recent literature underscores the importance of accounting for regime type in developing democracies to understand how education affects the degree and the nature of political engagement by the citizens living in those societies (Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017; Larreguy and Liu, 2023).

We revisit this perennial question in political science in the context of Christian missionary activity in the African context. We assess not only whether historical education-granting institutions matter for long-run political engagement, but also how and why regime types matter to understand how education shapes political development. To understand whether countries that satisfy what is seen as a "prerequisite" for democracy effectively transition to it, we must understand how their educated citizens interact with the political sphere. Even with enhanced abilities for political participation, educated

[1] Education is usually considered a bundle variable, as it is associated with other factors often thought to influence political participation, such as civic attitudes, higher income, etc. (Dee, 2004; Finkel, 2002; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995).

individuals might only participate more if schooling imparts them with civic values and they perceive a positive return from it (Isaksson, 2014).

As Europeans established settlements and colonies worldwide beginning in the fifteenth century, they sought to spread their Judeo-Christian faiths, particularly through missionary activity. Alongside and complementary to their drive to convert the local populations to Christianity, many European missionaries provided Western-style education to local populations and laid the foundations for future educational institutions. In Africa, the presence of missionaries has been found to have positive effects on long-run educational outcomes (*e.g.*, Cagé and Rueda, 2016; Nunn, 2010; Wantchekon, Klašnja and Novta, 2015). Alesina et al. (2021) further point to Christian missions as one of the strongest correlates behind inter-generational mobility in educational attainment in Africa.

The institutions that Christian missionaries established not only had long-run effects on education, but potentially also on political development. Whereas Tusalem (2009) and Woodberry (2012), for example, argue that Protestant missionaries contributed to democratic transition and consolidation around the world by establishing educational institutions and imparting civic-minded values, Dulay (2022) underscores the pivotal role of Catholic missions in nation-building in Southeast Asia by building local fiscal capacity and contributing to good governance. Within-country differences in elite's education—often a byproduct of differential exposure to missionary education—further led to divergent sociopolitical outcomes in the long-run (Ricart-Huguet, 2021).

Despite the recent proliferation of studies concerning the long-run consequences of missionary activity, causal identification has been challenging due to confounding demographic and geographic conditions, and institutional choices. Across the African continent, missionaries settled in densely populated areas where there were fewer environmental and geographic obstacles (Jedwab, Meier zu Selhausen and Moradi, 2022; Johnson, 1967). Moreover, the establishment of European settlements subsequently affected the local institutions' degree of inclusiveness and drove economic development (Acemoglu and

Robinson, 2001; Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007; Ricart-Huguet, 2022).

To deal with endogeneity concerns, we exploit unique features of the allocation of Catholic missionaries across space. Protestant missionary activity was largely decentralized and endogenous to the local demographic and geographic characteristics, following the *1917 Code of Canon Law*, Catholic activity was coordinated at the diocese level (Peters, 2001). Consequently, the presence of Catholic missionaries depended highly on the proximity to the diocese's headquarters. We employ a regression-discontinuity design (RDD) that exploits that, within villages near a historical Catholic diocese border, the diocese on which a village landed was exogenous to the village characteristics, and so was the proximity to the assigned diocese's headquarters.

Using respondents from the third to sixth rounds of the Afrobarometer, we restrict our sample to modern-day villages near the borders dividing Catholic dioceses *circa* 1910. We proxy for exposure to Catholic missionaries by using proximity to the diocese's headquarters. The closer a village is to its corresponding diocese's headquarters, the more likely the Catholic missionary activity was. Consequently, individuals living in such border villages closer to their diocese's headquarters should have experienced better educational opportunities, which we argue persist until today. Not only did European missionaries begin imparting education in the region, but they also laid the groundwork for the post-colonial educational institutions (Baten and Cappelli, 2016; Dupraz, 2019; Feldmann, 2016). Initial spatial differences in education were further reinforced by subsequent investments in education and by civil service recruitment practices that focused on levels of literacy (Huillery, 2009; Ricart-Huguet, 2021).

We estimate the impact of historic educational institutions across various individual-level economic, social, and in particular, political engagement outcomes. Given the emerging literature on the importance of regime type in explaining education's impact on political engagement (Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017; Larreguy and Liu, 2023), we further disaggregate our results on political outcomes across democracies,

open anocracies (*i.e.*, competitive authoritarian regimes), and closed anocracies (*i.e.*, *quasi* and full dictatorships), as measured by corresponding country Polity IV scores.

Results from our RDD first corroborate that proximity to a diocese's headquarters in 1910 predicts Catholic missionary activity around 1920. More importantly, we provide evidence that, within the sample of modern-day villages near the borders dividing Catholic dioceses *circa* 1910, the proximity to the diocese's headquarters is arguably exogenous to various factors known to have affected colonial and missionary settlement (Jedwab, Meier zu Selhausen and Moradi, 2022; Johnson, 1967). We also show that our results are robust to using country fixed effects, addressing the concern that some of the dioceses' borders coincide with country borders.

Second, we show that proximity to the diocese's headquarters has a positive causal effect on Catholicism today and various measures of education independent of regime type, which corroborates the importance of missionaries in establishing educational institutions. Estimates using data on the location of all modern schools for six African countries further support such importance. Consistent with previous literature, the effects on political outcomes differ largely based on the regime type. We show that the legacy of missionary education in open anocracies—but not in democracies and closed anocracies—led to individuals being more likely to vote and participate in local politics, as measured by contacting their local councilor and participating in community meetings, and less likely to protest.

Third, we unpack what drives these effects in differential political participation by focusing on two types of outcomes thought to be affected by schooling—political sophistication and civic values—and political attitudes. Only within open anocracies did the legacy of missionary education increase both citizens' political sophistication—measured by their labor market outcomes, news consumption, and interest in public affairs—and their civic values—measured by increased support for democratic institutions, while also reducing satisfaction with democracy and support for the incumbent. Within closed anocracies,

missionary exposure contributed to stronger civic values, as well as dissatisfaction with democracy and the incumbent, but it did not translate into greater political sophistication. In turn, in democracies, the legacy of missionary education led to greater relative political sophistication, and somewhat stronger civic values, but not greater dissatisfaction with democracy and the incumbent.

Our results are robust to multiple specifications and sample choices, including considering different bandwidths, adding country fixed effects, considering different samples to address multiple possible concerns, and controlling for two unbalanced covariates. Moreover, we show that our heterogenous results by regime type are not driven by the fact that democracies, open anocracies, and closed anocracies consistently differ on other observable country-level characteristics, and that differences in such characteristics cannot account for those results.

Ultimately, our results convey and advance two main ideas. First, we show that historical Catholic missionary activity had causal, positive long-run effects on religious identification and educational and economic outcomes. Second, we convey the heterogeneous effects by regime type of Catholic missionary activity on political participation. Contrary to early work on the positive association between education and political engagement (*e.g.*, Deutsch, 1961; Lipset, 1959), our findings are concentrated in open anocracies, which offer both opportunities and incentives for educated citizens to participate in politics. In line with more recent work (*e.g.*, Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017; Larreguy and Liu, 2023), these findings reinforce that, to understand how education affects political engagement, close attention should be paid to the regime type where individuals operate.

## 2 The political economy of missions

As Europeans colonized a sizable share of the habitable world, missionaries preceded them or followed suit. Missionaries tried to convert local populations to Christianity. In doing so, they relied on a wide variety of tactics: from forced conversions throughout much of colonial Latin America to enticements by providing education in many parts of Africa and Asia. The tactics employed varied greatly depending on the colonial setting and had important long-run socioeconomic effects.

Throughout modern-day Latin America and parts of Southeast Asia, Catholic missionaries had an advantage over Protestant ones. Being the state religion of Spain and Portugal, they enjoyed support from the Crown in spreading Catholicism and converting the local populations. In monopolistic settings, education provision by Catholic missionaries varied greatly by monastic orders (Waldinger, 2017). For example, Valencia Caicedo (2019) documents the positive, long-run effects of Jesuit missionaries on human capital development in America's Southern Cone.

In contrast, Africa experienced strong both Catholic and Protestant missionary presence. Although there is a strong correlation between the number of Catholic or Protestant missions in a modern-day African country and the predominant religion of its colonizers (Becker, 2021), for the most part, the colonizing power permitted rival missionaries in its territories. Gallego and Woodberry (2010), for example, highlight how the Portuguese allowed Protestant missionaries to operate in its African domains as long as they restricted their operations to a set distance—usually 20 kilometers—from Catholic missions.

While Protestant missionaries were largely geographically unrestricted in their operation, Catholic missionaries were organized within the boundaries of their respective dioceses.[2] In particular, the *1917 Code of Canon Law* called for "the territory of every diocese is to be divided up into distinct territorial parts; to each part a specific church and determined population are assigned [*sic*]" and likewise emphasized that "every cleric whatsoever

[2]This is aside from any restrictions placed by the European power with jurisdiction over a set territory.

must be ascribed to a given diocese or religious [institute], so that wandering clerics are in no way admitted" (Peters, 2001).

This led the Vatican to partly set the dioceses' boundaries based on the areas of the European colonies on the continent.[3] Although based on existing geographic and population endowments at the time of settlement (Jedwab, Meier zu Selhausen and Moradi, 2022; Johnson, 1967), the exact delimitation of colonial and diocese boundaries established by Europeans and the Vatican were relatively arbitrary (Englebert, Tarango and Carter, 2002; Hargreaves, 1985; McCauley and Posner, 2015; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013).

In Africa, the presence of both Catholic and Protestant missionaries spurred investments in educational institutions. Not wanting to lose out on potential converts, Catholic missionaries invested heavily in education to compete with Protestant ones (Gallego and Woodberry, 2010; Woodberry and Shah, 2004). Importantly, the education imparted by missionaries was not necessarily aimed at the masses or particular nation (identity)-building initiatives (Taylor, 1984), as it was with other education-expansion initiatives in other moments in history (Paglayan, 2020*a*,*b*).

Recent empirical evidence underscores the positive educational effects of historical missionary activity. Nunn (2010) shows that, in Africa, Protestant missionaries equally educated men and women, whereas Catholic missionaries were biased toward educating men. Cogneau and Moradi (2014) and Wantchekon, Klašnja and Novta (2015), furthermore, highlight the role of missions in Africa in providing venues to gain literacy and improve economic development. More recently, using census data to examine inter-generational mobility in educational attainment in over 20 countries in Africa, Alesina et al. (2021, 2023) show that Christian missions are one the strongest correlates behind such mobility.[4]

[3] Although these boundaries changed after most countries in the region gained independence in the 1950s and the 1960s, we are concerned with the legacy of the initial, historical distribution of missions *circa* 1910. Since the boundaries sometimes overlapped with country borders, we show robustness to including country fixed effects.

[4] While beyond the scope of this paper, there are many reasons that the literature has explored what is behind the persistence in educational outcomes, including the availability of teachers (Andrabi, Das

Overall, missions had a positive impact on modern-day human capital accumulation, and to some extent, economic development.[5] Although there are recent studies highlighting the positive, macro effects of missions on democratic institutions (Tusalem, 2009; Woodberry, 2012, *e.g.*,) and some evidence on their impact on voting behaviour (Cagé and Rueda, 2016), there is limited evidence on the full, causal ramifications of missionary activity on individual political engagement and attitudes, especially in a region with such divergent regimes as sub-Saharan Africa.

In turn, we exploit plausibly exogeneity in historical Catholic missionary presence to underscore its role in long-run political development. In doing so, we build on recent work suggesting that the effect of education on political participation varies in Africa across regime types, which we describe next.

# 3 Human capital and political engagement

A perennial debate in political science concerns how education, and its associated socioeconomic gains, affect individuals' degree of political engagement. Dating back to Mann (1848) and Lipset (1959), education has been deemed a "prerequisite" for democracy and for an active and engaged populace. In the developing world, in particular, early theories on modernization underscore the need for educated masses for meaningful transitions to democracy and political stability (Huntington, 2006; Lipset, 1959).

Education and its associated higher socioeconomic status are thought to be powerful drivers of civic attitudes and a concern for public life (Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Deutsch, 1961; Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). The empirical literature, however, is inconclusive on the causal effects of education on political engagement

and Khwaja, 2013), which was one of the main constraints faced by many universal primary education programs implemented in Africa (Larreguy and Marshall, 2017); parental investments (Andrabi, Das and Khwaja, 2012); and occupational choices (Valencia Caicedo, 2019); among others.

[5]Even recent studies that are critical on the long-run consequences of missionary activity for economic growth still highlight their role in fostering literacy and other human capital accumulation (Jedwab, zu Selhausen and Moradi, 2021).

and democratic attitudes. Although some findings underscore the positive role of education on political participation, broadly defined (Apfeld et al., 2022; Dee, 2004; Kam and Palmer, 2008; Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos, 2004), others question their causality (Marshall, 2016) and whether there is an association at all (Berinsky and Lenz, 2011).

More recent work further suggests that the effect of education on individuals' degree of political engagement in African developing democracies depends on the regime type of their polity. Under authoritarian regimes, educated voters may deliberately disengage, since their participation might not only have a limited effect in the political sphere, but may also legitimize the leader by signaling support for the regime (Croke et al., 2016). In turn, when democratic institutions are sufficiently strong, education increases political participation because it is a venue for political change (Larreguy and Marshall, 2017). Lastly, in relatively consolidated African democracies where policy differentiation across parties is limited, those who are more educated might see no differential return to participating in politics since there is little margin for changes in policy (Larreguy and Liu, 2023).

The literature on missionary activity and on the link between education and political engagement then allow us to make several predictions about the long-run effects of missionary activity on education and political development in Africa. First, following the extensive evidence on missionaries' attempts to convert the population via offering education, we hypothesize that missionary activity has lasting positive effects on contemporaneous religiosity and education outcomes:

**Hypothesis 1** *Missionary activity led to a persistent increase in religiosity and education.*

Second, in line with the just mentioned literature that points to regime type as a key moderating factor between education and political participation (Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017; Larreguy and Liu, 2023), we hypothesize that the positive effects of missionary education on modern political participation concentrated among open anocracies:

**Hypothesis 2** *Relative to closed anocracies or democracies, the effect of missionary activity on political participation is most positive in open anocracies.*

Open anocracies are high-stakes settings in terms of the opportunity they provide for democratic consolidation and backsliding. Individuals with more human capital and political sophistication—resulting from missionary activity—should be more inclined to participate in the political sphere to influence political development in this context. Democracies and closed regimes, in contrast, might not incentivize political participation or even push these individuals away from it as they might see no immediate returns to participation (*e.g.*, Berinsky and Lenz, 2011) or do not want to legitimize the regime (*e.g.*, Croke et al., 2016), respectively.

Third, we investigate what distinguishes open anocracies from democracies and closed anocracies that would lead to a more positive effect of education on political participation. Following the seminal work by Almond and Verba (2015), Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995), Deutsch (1961), and Huntington (2006), we hypothesize that open anocracies allow more politically sophisticated, educated individuals to perceive the return to political participation and act on their civic values:

**Hypothesis 3** *Historical missionary activity increases both contemporaneous political sophistication and civic values, as well as incentives for political participation, only in open anocracies.*

# 4 Empirical strategy

This section describes the various data sources from which we draw to capture historic missionary presence, and individual-level religiosity, schooling, and economic and political development across regime types, before outlining our empirical identification strategy. Summary statistics for the pooled sample are in Table A1, for democracies in Table A2, for open anocracies in Table A3, and for closed anocracies in A4.

## Data

Our analysis predominantly relies on three data sources: (i) four rounds of Afrobarometer surveys, (ii) historical information reflecting missionary activity in Africa *circa* 1910 and 1920, (iii) data on the location of modern-day schools for six countries, and (iv) data on regime type.

### Afrobarometer data

We draw our main dependent variables from the third to the sixth rounds of Afrobarometer data, for which we have the geographic coordinates for the sampled villages. These surveys sample demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, and measures of political attitudes and participation, of African adults. Next, we describe our main outcome variables (see more details in Appendix A1).

Since missionaries across the continent used education to convert the natives, our first set of outcome variables concerns religious and educational outcomes, which should capture long-run effects of historical missionary activity. Specifically, for religiosity, we consider an indicator for *Catholic* identification. For educational outcomes, we create an ordinal variable that captures the possible educational levels of a respondent's *Schooling*. Furthermore, we create indicator variables for having *Any Primary* schooling, and *Any Secondary* schooling.

Our study predominantly concerns the impact of historical missionary exposure on political engagement, both in national and local politics. For the former, we measure whether a respondent *Voted* in the last election and whether she *Contacted Local Councilor*. For the latter, we measure whether the respondent *Attended Community Meeting*, and whether she *Raised an Issue* at the meeting. Recent work by Finkel (2002) shows that these two types of political participation complement each other strongly. In our robustness analysis, we also consider whether a respondent reported *Attending Protests* and engaging in *Vote Selling*.

Education might lead to greater political participation through increased individual sophistication and democratic values, particularly when educated individuals perceive a return from participation. To capture sophistication in various ways, we first look at whether a respondent is employed (*Employed*), which reflects the market value of her skills. Second, we assess a respondent's interest in politics, as reflected by *Radio News Consumption*, a variable that captures how often she consumes news via the radio, the most widespread source of news in Africa, and *Discuss Politics*, a variable that indicates the extent to which a respondent reports discussing politics when with friends and family.

Then, to account for individuals' democratic values, we consider an index that reflects a respondent's support for democratic institutions (*Support for Democratic Institutions*), which includes whether the respondent rejects one-man rule, whether the respondent rejects one-party rule, whether the respondent agrees that civil society organizations and political parties are needed, whether the respondent agrees that the parliament and not the president should write laws, whether the respondent agrees that the president has to obey laws, whether the respondent agrees that parliament should monitor the president, and whether the respondent supports term limits. Lastly, to capture the return to political participation, first, we consider the extent to which a respondent is *Satisfied with Democracy* in her country. Second, we measure how a respondent evaluates the national *Incumbent Performance* and whether she expresses that she feels *Close to the Incumbent Party* or *Close to an Opposition Party*.

**Missionary activity**

Our second set of data concerns historical information about the location of Catholic dioceses and their headquarters *circa* 1910, and missions across Africa around 1920. We obtained and geocoded the Catholic dioceses' boundaries and headquarters *circa* 1910 from Streit (1913). We use the data on geocoded Catholic and Protestant missions around

Figure 1: Catholic dioceses' borders, their headquarters, and missions in Africa c. 1910



*Notes*: The gray boundaries delineate the Catholic dioceses' boundaries and the red triangles the approximate location of their headquarters *circa* 1910. The blue circles indicate the approximate location of Catholic and Protestant missions around 1920. **Source:** Streit (1913) and Nunn (2010).

1920 from Nunn (2010). The geocoded dioceses' boundaries and headquarters, as well as the missions from Nunn (2010), are rendered in Figure 1.

Using their villages' geographic coordinates, we spatially mapped the Afrobarometer respondents to their corresponding diocese *circa* 1910. Table A6 shows how many different dioceses existed in each country in our data.[6] We then computed the proximity of each respondent's village to their corresponding diocese's headquarters *circa* 1910, the proximity to the closest diocese's border, and the number of both Catholic missions

[6]In Section 6, we conduct a robustness check where we remove countries with only one diocese.

within 50 kilometers, distinguishing between those operating in the dioceses to which the respondent's village belongs from those operating in other neighboring dioceses.

**School Locations**

To investigate the effect of distance to diocese headquarters on long-term education provision, we collect data on the location of schools in six African countries: Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda. We then create grid cells of 0.1 degrees by 0.1 degrees (at the equator, this is about 11km by 11km) and count the number of schools in each cell. We calculate each cell's distance to the closest diocese boundary, the distance to the corresponding diocese headquarters, and the population density in 1880. We drop grid cells where the centroid is within 5km of the boundary, which are likely to be split by the boundary and therefore not fully in one diocese, and those from the diocese of Zanzibar since the diocese headquarters is located on an island in a different country than the majority of the diocese.

**Regime type**

Lastly, to measure regime type, we use Polity IV data. To show how such data meaningfully captures the strength of democratic institutions in our sample, in Figure 2, we restrict to the Polity IV data that overlaps with the Afrobarometer data, and plot the main characteristics from which the Polity IV index draws from to create the regime type classifications.[7] On average, democracies—and to a lesser extent, open anocracies—have established rules of executive succession ("Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment (ER)"), more competition and plurality of representation in executive recruitment ("Competitiveness of ER," "Openness of ER," "Regulation of Participation," and "Competitiveness of Participation"), and "Executive Constraints." Table A5 shows for each country in our data whether in a

[7]The only exception is São Tomé and Príncipee for which there is no Polity IV data, as it does not meet Polity IV's population requirements to be included.

Figure 2: Characteristics of Regime Type




*Notes*: The Polity IV data is restricted to the observations that overlap with the third to sixth round of Afrobarometer, with the exception of São Tomé and Príncipe for which there is no polity IV data. We show the mean of the different variables that make up the Polity IV score by regime type. In parentheses after the variable names, we indicate the maximum score possible based on the Polity IV codebook ("Regulation of Participation" does not have a best score, but a value of three indicates strong sectarian influences and divisions in candidate selection, while a value of one indicates fluid political participation without overbearing favoritism to a particular group). Democracies always have the largest means, followed—for most characteristics—by open anocracies. We include 95% confidence intervals. "E.R." refers to executive recruitment.

given year it is classified as a democracy, open anocracy, or closed anocracy according to its polity score. In Section 6, we show that our results are robust to removing countries that are within one point of another regime-type classification.

## Identification strategy

To estimate the impact of Catholic missionary activity, we cannot simply leverage the spatial distribution of such missions across Africa. Missionaries established missionary settlements around densely populated areas and where settlement conditions were propitious (Jedwab, Meier zu Selhausen and Moradi, 2022; Johnson, 1967). To overcome this endogeneity, we first exploit that, while Protestant missionaries operated relatively freely, Catholic missionaries were circumscribed to their demarcated diocese and overseen from their respective headquarters (Peters, 2001). As a consequence, the closer to a diocese's headquarters, the more likely the presence of a Catholic mission.

Figure 3: The intuition behind our identification strategy




*Notes*: Two border villages are circumscribed within two different dioceses, A and B. The border village in diocese A is relatively closer to its corresponding diocese's headquarters than the border village in diocese B. As a consequence, the former is more likely to experience the presence of Catholic missionaries.

Second, since the distance to the corresponding diocese's headquarters might be confounded, we restrict our sample to modern-day villages near a Catholic diocese border *circa* 1910. Our identifying assumption is that the diocese on which any such

border village landed was exogenous to the village characteristics, and so was the distance to the corresponding diocese's headquarters. Figure 3 illustrates this considering the case of two villages located at the border of two dioceses, A and B. The border village in diocese A is relatively closer to its corresponding diocese's headquarters than the border village in diocese B. As a consequence, the former is more likely to experience the presence of Catholic missionaries.

Our baseline specification is a local linear regression discontinuity design that, inspired by Henn (2021), estimates the causal effect of proximity to the dioceses' headquarters by running the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression within a 10 kilometer bandwidth from the diocese's border:[8,9]

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{i,b,r} \quad = \quad & \beta_1 \text{Proximity to Diocese Headquarter}_{i,b,r} + \beta_2 \text{Distance to Border}_{i,b,r} \\ & + \beta_3 \text{Closer to Diocese Headquarter}_{i,b,r} \times \text{Distance to Border}_{i,b,r} \\ & + \mathbf{X}_{i,b,r} + \eta_b + \epsilon_{i,b,r} \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where $Y_{i,b,r}$ is an outcome of interest for respondent $i$ who is close to a diocese's border $b$ during round $r$, Proximity to Diocese Headquarter$_{i,b,r}$ is the minus logarithm distance of a respondent's village to the corresponding diocese's headquarters, Distance to Border$_{i,b,r}$ is the distance of the village to the closest border, Closer to Diocese Headquarter$_{i,b,r}$ is an indicator that the village is closer to its dioceses headquarters relative to the villages in the neighboring dioceses at the other side of the border, $\mathbf{X}_{i,b,r}$ is a vector of respondent-level controls including Afrobarometer-round fixed effects, and $\eta_b$ are border fixed effects. We cluster our standard errors at the border level.

To ease concerns that our results are driven by a particular selection of variables or point estimates, we draw inferences based on indexes of variables of interest. In

[8]This specification is analytically the same as using a continuous treatment variable—with a 0 on the side far away from the diocese headquarters and the average difference between the distances on both sides for the side closest to the headquarters—instead of the minus log distance

[9]We show that results are robust to the choice of bandwidth.

particular, we compute the index using the $\alpha$ command in Stata, which calculates the standardized index for every observation for which there is a response to at least one variable in the index, as well as the Cronbach's alpha for variables in the index.

Moreover, following recent work that suggests that education has an effect on political attitudes and engagement that varies across regime type (Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017; Larreguy and Liu, 2023), we are particularly interested in identifying how the effect of interest varies with the extent of democratic institutions. To that end, we estimate Equation 1 for three separate samples based on the Polity IV index of respondents' corresponding countries at the time they were surveyed, which divides them into three broad categories: democracies, open anocracies, and closed anocracies.

# 5 Results

We now present our main findings. We first show that the proximity to the diocese's headquarters is well balanced across determinants of missionary settlements within the set of villages near a Catholic diocese border *circa* 1910. We then show that proximity significantly predicts Catholic missionary presence around 1920. We next show that proximity had long-run effects on individuals' religious identification and schooling.

We then look at the effect that these missionary-induced increases in educational attainment had on political behavior. Although the positive results on socioeconomic outcomes are consistently estimated across regime types, the effects on political engagement differ largely depending on the strength of democratic institutions. While the individuals who experienced greater exposure to historical missionary presence tend to be more politically engaged in open anocracies, they are less engaged in democracies and closed anocracies.

To explain this differential effect across regime types, we first show that historical missionary activity significantly predicts higher levels of political sophistication only

in democracies and open anocracies. More educated citizens do not exhibit greater consumption and discussion of political news in closed anocracies. We then show that missionary activity led to higher support for democratic institutions but greater dissatisfaction with their democracy and their incumbent in open and closed anocracies, but not in democracies. Together, these results highlight how only open anocracies in Africa have both the political space as well as the incentives for more educated citizens to become more politically active.

## Balance

First, we investigate balance on climatic and geographical covariates. In Table 1, we present the results of OLS regressions using Equation 1 for the pooled sample on various predetermined geographic covariates. We show that the historical proximity to the diocese's headquarters is balanced across climatic and geographic factors known to have affected colonial and missionary settlement (Johnson, 1967). In Panel A, we show balance on climatic and geographic variables known to affect settler mortality. Consistent with chance, only one outcome is significantly associated with proximity at the 10% level.

In Panel B, we show balance on variables capturing privileged locations that facilitated access to missionaries (Jedwab, Meier zu Selhausen and Moradi, 2022; Johnson, 1967): distance to historical explorer routes, distance to colonial railways, distance to the closest waterway, distance to the coast, distance to the modern-day capital, and distance to the national border. Also consistent with chance, only one outcome is significantly associated with proximity. In Panel C, we show balance on access to natural resources within 50 kilometers: number of diamond mines, number of oil fields, number of gas fields, and an index of cash crop suitability. Lastly, also in Panel C, we show balance on the gender and age of the Afrobarometer respondents in our sample. Overall, these results lend support to the plausibly exogeneity of the proximity to the diocese's headquarters within the set of villages near a Catholic diocese border.

Table 1: Balance

| **Panel A:** Climate and Geography | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Precipitation | (2) Temperature Elevation | (3) Log Elevation | (4) Ruggedness | (5) Malaria Index | (6) TseTse Index |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0223 | 0.0441 | -0.203 | -0.132 | -0.145* | -0.0288 |
| | (0.0384) | (0.0482) | (0.131) | (0.0814) | (0.0838) | (0.0777) |
| Observations | 9524 | 9524 | 9914 | 9988 | 10070 | 8926 |
| $R^2$ | 0.937 | 0.911 | 0.855 | 0.580 | 0.882 | 0.758 |

| **Panel B:** Location | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Distance to Explorer Routes | (2) Distance to Colonial Railway | (3) Distance to a Waterway | (4) Distance to Coast | (5) Distance to Capital | (6) Distance to National Border |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0361 | -0.00228 | -0.0717 | -0.288 | -0.529*** | -0.105 |
| | (0.0880) | (0.0483) | (0.0950) | (0.175) | (0.152) | (0.128) |
| Observations | 10070 | 10070 | 10070 | 10070 | 10070 | 10070 |
| $R^2$ | 0.907 | 0.874 | 0.819 | 0.805 | 0.796 | 0.824 |

| **Panel C:** Natural Resources & Individual Controls | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Diamonds within 50 km | (2) Oil within 50 km | (3) Gas within 50 km | (4) Cash Crop Suitability | (5) Gender | (6) Age |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.00328 | 0.0798 | 0.0212 | -0.00171 | 0.00326 | -0.0355 |
| | (0.0169) | (0.0535) | (0.0473) | (0.0925) | (0.00310) | (0.0366) |
| Observations | 10070 | 10070 | 10070 | 9402 | 10070 | 9964 |
| $R^2$ | 0.922 | 0.712 | 0.855 | 0.570 | 0.000 | 0.061 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using the specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border *circa* 1910. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' headquarters in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2: Missionary presence, religious identification and schooling

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence & Religious Identification | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Catholic Missions in corresponding diocese (< 50 kms.) | (2) Catholic Missions in neighboring diocese (< 50 kms.) | (3) Catholic today |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.465*** | 0.0880 | 0.0525*** |
| | (0.164) | (0.0582) | (0.0186) |
| Observations | 10070 | 10070 | 9746 |
| $R^2$ | 0.755 | 0.319 | 0.120 |
| **Panel B:** Education | *Dependent variable:* | | |
| | (1) Schooling Ordinal | (2) Any Primary | (3) Any Secondary |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.272*** | 0.0326** | 0.0591*** |
| | (0.0820) | (0.0131) | (0.0202) |
| Observations | 9945 | 9945 | 9945 |
| $R^2$ | 0.232 | 0.191 | 0.236 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using the specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border *circa* 1910. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. $^{*}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.01$

## Missionary exposure, religious identification, and education

We turn to whether historical proximity to the diocese's headquarters significantly predicts Catholic missionary activity. In Table 2, Panel A, we present the results for the pooled sample on exposure to Catholic missionary presence. In Column (1), we show that proximity to the diocese's headquarters *circa* 1910 significantly predicts more Catholic missionary activity within 50 kilometers in the corresponding diocese around 1920. In turn, Column (2) shows that, consistent with the rules of operation of Catholic missions that we exploit for identification, this significantly greater activity is solely driven by missionaries operating in the corresponding diocese. In terms of religious adherence, Column (3) of Panel A shows a significant positive effect of historical proximity to a

diocese's headquarters on modern Catholic identification. Overall, these results corroborate that the historical proximity to the diocese's headquarters significantly predicts greater Catholic missionary presence and long-term Catholic conversion.

With regard to educational attainment, Column (1) in Panel B shows that proximity to a diocese's headquarters significantly predicts more schooling, as captured by an ordinal scale of levels of school completion. Columns (2) and (3) of Panel B show that this effect on schooling is consistently estimated when we use binary indicators of any primary or secondary education. Overall, these results are consistent with Nunn (2010), Gallego and Woodberry (2010) and Valencia Caicedo (2019)'s findings on the long-run effects of missionary activity on religious identification and education.

One potential channel through which missionary activity could have a persistent effect on education outcomes today is school construction. Figure 4 shows the correlation between log distance to diocese headquarters and the number of schools in a $0.1 \times 0.1$ degree grid cell. There is a strong negative correlation. Grid cells close to their respective diocese headquarters have substantially more schools. Appendix Table A7 shows the results of running specification 1 while varying the bandwidth of grid cells included from within 10km of a diocese boundary to 50km. Proximity to a diocese's headquarters is associated with more schools indicating that missionary activity had a lasting effect on the provision of education.

## Political participation

Turning to our main results, Table 3 shows the effects of historical proximity to a diocese's headquarters on political participation across regime types. Specifically, to measure their participation in national politics, we focus on whether individuals voted in the previous general elections and whether individuals contacted a local councilor. Then, to measure participation in local politics, we look at whether they attended a community meeting and have raised an issue in such a meeting. Results in Panel A, first, indicate

Figure 4: Effect of Proximity to Diocese Headquarters of Modern-Day Schools




*Notes*: This figure shows the relationship between log distance to diocese headquarters (x-axis) and the number of schools (y-axis) for all 0.1 × 0.1 degree grid cells in the countries in our sample. Black dots show a scatter plot and orange dots a binscatter. The linear trend is shown in red and the polynomial in blue.

that there is a significant positive effect of proximity on the combined index of political participation, but only in open anocracies. In democracies and closed anocracies, the effect is negative.[10]

Consistently, the results in Panel B indicate that proximity leads to an increased likelihood of voting and contacting a local councilor in open anocracies, whereas the effect reverses in democracies.[11] Similarly, in Panel C, the findings show a positive effect of proximity on attending community meetings and raising issues at them in open anocracies. However, this effect is negative in democracies and closed anocracies, albeit only statistically significant in the latter. Altogether, these results indicate that more educated individuals, as a result of increased historical missionary presence, are more

[10]Importantly, results in Table A12 indicate that the results on political participation are not driven by vote buying, as measured by whether the respondent reported engaging in vote selling.

[11]Separate results for each of the component variables in Table 3 are reported in Table A8.

likely to participate in national and local politics, but only in open anocracies, where recent literature on Africa indicates that the return to political participation should be greater. Moreover, these effects are only present for less contentious political participation since the results in Table A11 indicate that the effects are the opposite when considering whether respondents reported attending protests as an outcome.

## Political sophistication, civic values, and political attitudes

The literature on political behavior, particularly in developing contexts, points to two main channels through which education might affect political participation: increased political sophistication and greater civic values and incentives to participate. Table 4 shows the effect of historical proximity to a diocese's headquarters on outcomes capturing political sophistication. We first measure political sophistication by focusing on individuals' labor market outcomes. We build on the fact that individuals are more likely to be employed when the market values their skills to perform the job they are hired for, which is likely associated with their overall, including political, skills. We also assess whether individuals are more politically sophisticated as reflected by their interest in politics, which we measure with their news consumption and whether they discuss politics.

Results in Panel A of Table 4 indicate that proximity leads to significantly higher values of a combined index of political sophistication in all settings except closed anocracies. Panels B and C show, separately, that proximity significantly predicts higher levels of employment, radio news consumption, and discussion of politics in democracies and open anocracies.[12] Altogether, these results show that proximity led to greater political sophistication in democracies and open anocracies, while closed anocracies do not offer an opportunity for more educated citizens to gain employment and increase their consumption and discussion of political news.

[12]The effects on the combined index for news consumption and discussion of politics are sizable, but are only significant when pooling all observations. Separate results for each of the component variables in Panel C or Table 4 are reported in Table A9.

Table 3: The effect on political participation by regime type

| **Panel A:** | *Dependent variable:* Index of Political Participation | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0252 | -0.0858* | 0.0810*** | -0.0484** |
| | (0.0248) | (0.0445) | (0.0188) | (0.0196) |
| Observations | 9961 | 4652 | 1418 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.203 | 0.193 | 0.173 | 0.249 |
| **Panel B:** | *Dependent variable:* Index of Voted and Contacted Councilor | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0144 | -0.0627** | 0.0713*** | -0.00244 |
| | (0.0251) | (0.0282) | (0.0204) | (0.0253) |
| Observations | 9958 | 4651 | 1416 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.116 | 0.110 | 0.111 | 0.162 |
| **Panel C:** | *Dependent variable:* Index of Community Participation | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0369 | -0.104 | 0.0909** | -0.0881** |
| | (0.0336) | (0.0666) | (0.0410) | (0.0323) |
| Observations | 9912 | 4635 | 1403 | 3874 |
| $R^2$ | 0.204 | 0.192 | 0.182 | 0.264 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using the specification in Equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border *circa* 1910. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. The index in Panel A combines whether the respondent Voted, Contacted Local Councilor, Attended a Community Meeting and Raised an Issue. Panel B combines whether the respondent Voted and Contacted Local Councilor. Panel C combines whether the respondent Attended a Community Meeting and Raised an Issue. Results for each of the component variables are reported in Table A8. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

In turn, results in Table 5 test whether the differential effect of proximity to the diocese's headquarters on political participation is explained by greater civic values originating from increased schooling, and increased perceived returns from participation.

Table 4: The effect on political sophistication by regime type

| **Panel A:** | *Dependent variable:* Index on Political Sophistication | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0457** | 0.0845*** | 0.0739** | 0.0301 |
| | (0.0193) | (0.0308) | (0.0350) | (0.0450) |
| Observations | 9964 | 4652 | 1421 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.130 | 0.132 | 0.145 | 0.159 |
| **Panel B:** | *Dependent variable:* Employed | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0186 | 0.0665*** | 0.0320** | 0.00985 |
| | (0.0184) | (0.0168) | (0.0136) | (0.0211) |
| Observations | 9919 | 4638 | 1394 | 3887 |
| $R^2$ | 0.098 | 0.123 | 0.122 | 0.109 |
| **Panel C:** | *Dependent variable:* Radio News Consumption and Discuss Politics | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0483** | 0.0567 | 0.0765 | 0.0326 |
| | (0.0235) | (0.0397) | (0.0570) | (0.0571) |
| Observations | 9963 | 4651 | 1421 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.101 | 0.095 | 0.114 | 0.123 |

This table presents results using the specification in Equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border *circa* 1910. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. The index in Panel A combines whether the respondent is *Employed*, *Radio News Consumption*, and the extent to which the respondent *Discuss Politics*. Panel C combines respondent's *Radio News Consumption* and the extent to which the respondent *Discuss Politics*. Results for each of the component variables are reported in Table A9. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

In Panel A, we show that proximity leads to significantly greater support for democratic institutions in open and closed anocracies, although the magnitude and sign of the effect is comparable in democracies. In turn, results in Panel B show that proximity leads to significantly lower levels of satisfaction with democracy in open and closed anocracies, but not in democracies. Similarly, results in Panel C show that proximity negatively

predicts an index capturing views on incumbent performance and incumbent support again only in open and closed anocracies.[13]

Taken together, these results underscore the importance of understanding the drivers of political participation by more educated individuals across regime types, as to better understand the role that education might play in political transitions. More educated individuals might not necessarily participate more in politics unless they have both greater political sophistication and civic values and perceive a positive return from participation. We interpret this as a limitation of the long-run effects of missionary exposure and educational institutions on political development.

# 6 Robustness

This section presents the results from several robustness checks. First, we decompose the indexes used in Section 5 and show the results for each component separately. Second, we show the results using 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 50 kilometers as bandwidth. Third, we vary the specifications by including country fixed effects, dropping extreme outliers, and controlling for the few unbalanced covariates. Fourth, we rerun the analysis restricting the sample of countries to exclude North African countries, kingdoms, and island nations separately. Fifth, we run the specification separately for former British colonies and other countries. Lastly, we test whether democracies, open anocracies, and closed anocracies are consistently different on other observable country-level characteristics and show that those characteristics cannot explain our results. Throughout the robustness checks, the results remain qualitatively the same.

Our main specification restricts the sample to Afrobarometer villages within 10 kilometers of the closest diocese boundary. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the coefficients on proximity to diocese headquarters when varying the bandwidth. 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 50-kilometer bandwidths are shown. The results remain consistent across specifications,

[13]Separate results for each of the component variables in Panel C or Table 5 are reported in Table A10.

Table 5: The effect on civil values and political attitudes by regime type

| **Panel A:** | *Dependent variable:* Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0707*** | 0.0453 | 0.0638* | 0.0499* |
| | (0.0203) | (0.0388) | (0.0357) | (0.0250) |
| Observations | 9899 | 4625 | 1407 | 3867 |
| $R^2$ | 0.070 | 0.065 | 0.118 | 0.066 |
| **Panel B:** | *Dependent variable:* Satisfied with Democracy | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.110** | -0.0226 | -0.0928*** | -0.0907** |
| | (0.0530) | (0.0325) | (0.0237) | (0.0405) |
| Observations | 8991 | 4245 | 1248 | 3498 |
| $R^2$ | 0.114 | 0.088 | 0.097 | 0.198 |
| **Panel C:** | *Dependent variable:* Incumbent Performance and Support | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0940** | -0.0178 | -0.109** | -0.110*** |
| | (0.0369) | (0.0523) | (0.0529) | (0.0290) |
| Observations | 9703 | 4552 | 1376 | 3775 |
| $R^2$ | 0.091 | 0.086 | 0.220 | 0.156 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using the specification in Equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border *circa* 1910. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. The index of *Support for Democratic Institutions* in Panel A combines whether the respondent rejects one-man rule, rejects one-party rule, agrees that civil society organizations and political parties are needed, the individual agrees that the parliament and not the president should write laws, agrees that the president has to obey laws, agrees that parliament should monitor the president, and supports term limits. Panel C combines how the respondent evaluates the *Incumbent Performance* and whether she expresses she feels *Close to the Incumbent Party* or *Close to an Opposition Party*. Results for each of the component variables are reported in Table A10. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

albeit some precision is lost when extending the bandwidth to 50 kilometers.

We show in Section 5 that proximity to diocese headquarters is balanced on a range of geographic covariates. Nevertheless, to make sure that our results are not driven by

the combination of these geographic factors that might explain missionary location, we also control for indexes for the three sets of geographic covariates in the second set of coefficients in Figure A2, while the first set of coefficients in the figure show the results of our main specification. The third set of coefficients comes from a specification that only includes the two covariates that are unbalanced: malaria suitability and distance to the national capital. Since many diocese boundaries coincide with country borders, we also include country fixed effects in the fourth set of coefficients in Figure A2. To ensure that our results are not driven by extreme outliers, we remove the 5% of observations with the largest distance to their diocese headquarters in the fifth set of coefficients in Figure A2.

Furthermore, we consider different restrictions to the sample. North Africa differs from the rest of the continent in two important ways. First, its proximity to Europe meant that it had a different colonial experience, most notably being exposed for longer. Second, North African countries represented a different religious environment in which missionaries had to operate, namely competition with Islam and the pre-existing presence of Christian communities. Due to these differences, we rerun the analysis after removing North African countries from the sample in the sixth set of coefficients shown in Figure A2. Island nations—Madagascar and Cape Verde—similarly had different geographic constraints that influenced missionary activity. The results after removing these countries from the sample are in the seventh set of coefficients in Figure A2. Third, political participation operates very differently in monarchies. We therefore exclude the kingdoms of Lesotho and Swaziland in the eighth set of coefficients.

Colonial administrations often differed depending on the colonizing country. Specifically, British colonial policy regarding the regulation of missionary activities was often different than that of other, mostly Catholic, colonizers. The next two sets of coefficients in Figure A2 thus show the results separately for former British colonies and other countries. Next, we remove countries whose polity score was within one of falling under a different

classification and the last set of coefficients shows the results when removing countries with only one diocese in them. Across all specifications in Figure A2, the results remain virtually unchanged.

Lastly, we test whether the heterogeneous findings across regime types are driven by other country-level characteristics that correlate with regime type. We collect 22 country-level variables covering geographical, institutional, and historical characteristics. We conduct t-tests comparing the mean of these variables in democracies to open anocracies, as well as democracies to closed anocracies, and open to closed anocracies. Out of the 66 t-tests reported in Table A23 only 2 are significant at the 10% level and 4 at the 5% level, roughly in line with what we expect to occur by chance. Further, the results are not surprising. Democracies score higher on country-level institutional variables, namely the rule of law index, taxes collected as a percentage of GDP, and failed state index. We then take the unbalanced country-level variables (Gemstones, Rule of Law Index, Failed State Index, and Taxes as % of GDP) and split the countries in our sample in terciles of each variable. Figure A3 shows the results when splitting our sample into these terciles instead of democracy, open anocracy, and closed anocracy. None of the other country-level variables show the same pattern as our main results. This makes us confident that our results are not driven by confounding country-level characteristics.

# 7 Conclusion

Despite the positive legacy of missionary activity on socioeconomic wellbeing in Africa, our results suggest that its long-run effects on political development largely depend on a country's regime type. More educated individuals, as a result of the proximity of their villages to the diocese's headquarters *circa* 1910, are more likely to engage in national and local politics, but only in open anocracies. These results are consistent with recent findings on political disengagement depending on the nature of the regime type in Africa

(Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017; Larreguy and Liu, 2023).

Concerning for those scholars who emphasize the importance of education for democratic consolidation, such an increase in political participation is not only driven by increased civic values, but also by the combination of increased political sophistication and incentives to participate resulting from greater discontent with their democracy and incumbent. Only open anocracies offer educated citizens the opportunities and incentives to increase their political participation.

Our results underscore the need to pay close attention to regime types as well as to citizens' motives when trying to understand how education affects political participation and, ultimately, democratic consolidation. Future research should also investigate how the education provided by missionaries compares to other policies aimed at increasing education, especially those aimed at the masses and nation-building (Paglayan, 2020*b*). If education is to be deemed a *sine qua non* for democracy (Almond and Verba, 2015; Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Deutsch, 1961), its origins and institutional interactions cannot be overlooked.

Lastly, there is a need for more casual work on the macro relationship between historical education institutions on political participation and democratic attitudes. To provide causality, we focus on individual-level estimates, and thus some of our findings should be cautiously extrapolated to draw macro conclusions. For example, the lack of an effect of proximity on satisfaction with democracy in democracies does not imply that, at a macro level, education has not led to democratization or that citizens in democratic countries exhibit greater satisfaction with democracy. In turn, it simply indicates that, in such a context, more educated individuals do not exhibit differential satisfaction. While this is useful for explaining how historical missionary exposure and educational opportunities shape contemporaneous individual political participation, it does not speak to the macro relationship between education and satisfaction with democracy.

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# Online Appendix: Missionary Activity, Education, and Long-run Political Development: Evidence from Africa

# A1 Description of variables

Our variables for analyses are coded as follows:

- **Catholic:** Coded 1 if respondent reported she is a Catholic; 0 otherwise.
- **Schooling:** Ordinal variable of the level of schooling attained by the respondent ranging from 0 if she has no formal schooling to 8 if she has post-graduate studies.
- **Any Primary:** Coded 1 if respondent reported having some primary education; 0 otherwise.
- **Secondary:** Coded 1 if respondent reported having some secondary education; 0 otherwise.
- **Voted:** Coded 1 if respondent reported voting in the past election; 0 otherwise.
- **Contacted Local Councilor:** Ordinal variable capturing the extent to which the respondent contacted a local government councilor in the past year ranging from 0 if never to 3 if often.
- **Attended Community Meeting:** Ordinal variable capturing the extent to which the respondent attended a community meeting in the past year ranging from 0 if not and she would never do it to 4 if often.
- **Raised an Issue:** Ordinal variable capturing the extent to which the respondent has joined others to raise an issue in the past year ranging from 0 if not and she would never do it to 4 if often.
- **Employed:** Coded 1 if respondent reported being employed at least part-time; 0 otherwise.
- **Radio News Consumption:** Ordinal variables describing how often the respondents consumes news via the radio. The variable ranges from 0 if never to 4 if every day.
- **Discuss Politics:** Ordinal variable describing the extent to which the respondent discusses politics with friends or family ranging from 0 if never to 2 if frequently.
- **Support of Democracy:** Coded 1 if the respondent agrees that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; 0 otherwise.
- **Support for Democratic Institutions:** Index of variables including whether the respondent rejects one-man rule, whether the individual rejects one-party rule, whether the respondent agrees that civil society organizations and political parties are needed, whether the respondent agrees that the parliament and not the president should write laws, whether the respondent agrees that the president has to obey laws, whether the respondent agrees that parliament should monitor the president, and whether the respondent supports term limits.
- **Satisfied with Democracy:** Ordinal variable describing the extent to which the respondent reports being satisfied with the way democracy works in her country ranging from if the respondent does not consider it a a democracy to 4 if very satisfied.
- **Incumbent Performance:** An index of how the respondent evaluates the performance of the president or prime minister, their MP, and their local government councilor. Each variable ranges from 1 if strongly disapprove to 4 if strongly approve.

- **Close to Incumbent Party:** Coded 1 if the respondent reports supporting the party in power; 0 otherwise.
- **Close to Opposition Party:** Coded 1 if the respondent reports supporting an opposition party; 0 otherwise.

# A2 Additional figures

Figure A1: Changing the Bandwidth




*Notes*: This figure shows the coefficient on Proximity to Dioceses Headquarters on various outcomes of interest. The bandwidth is varied between 5 and 50 kilometers with 10 kilometers being the main specification. The 95% and 90% confidence intervals are plotted for each bandwidth.

## Figure A2: Changing the Specification




*Notes*: This figure shows the coefficient on Proximity to Dioceses Headquarters on various outcomes of interest. Each panel shows the coefficients for different model specification. The 95% and 90% confidence intervals are plotted for each specification.

Figure A3: Country-Level Variables




*Notes*: This figure shows the coefficient on Proximity to Dioceses Headquarters on various outcomes of interest. In the Baseline specification the results are shown for the pooled sample, and democracies, open anocracies, and closed anocracies separately. In the other specification, the sample is instead divided using terciles of various country level variables. The 95% and 90% confidence intervals are plotted for each specification.

# A3 Additional tables

## A3.1 Summary Statistics

Table A1: Summary Statistic of full sample

| | Mean | Standard Deviation | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 2.60 | 1.01 | 0.00 | 5.38 |
| Distance Afrobarometer to Diocese Border (in km) | 4.90 | 3.00 | 0.00 | 9.98 |
| Cath. Mission within 50 km | 0.68 | 1.28 | 0.00 | 5.00 |
| Cath. Mission within 50 km in Neighboring Diocese | 0.26 | 0.73 | 0.00 | 5.00 |
| Catholic today | 0.26 | 0.44 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Schooling Ordinal | 2.54 | 1.84 | 0.00 | 8.00 |
| Any Primary | 0.85 | 0.36 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Any Secondary | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Skilled Labor | 0.25 | 0.43 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Index of political participation | -0.02 | 0.69 | -1.70 | 1.61 |
| *Voted* | 0.73 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *Contacted local gov. councilor* | 0.49 | 0.90 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| *Index of community engagement* | -0.09 | 0.91 | -1.70 | 1.45 |
| *Attend a community meeting* | 2.13 | 1.32 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Join others to raise an issue* | 1.86 | 1.31 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Index of political sophistication | 0.01 | 0.65 | -2.07 | 1.41 |
| *Employed* | 0.39 | 0.49 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *News consumption on radio* | 2.96 | 1.44 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Discuss politics with others* | 0.90 | 0.72 | 0.00 | 2.00 |
| Satisfaction with democracy | 2.34 | 1.06 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Support for democratic institutions | 2.81 | 0.73 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Index of incumbent evaluation and support | -0.07 | 0.81 | -2.29 | 1.73 |
| *Performance of incumbent* | 2.10 | 1.20 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Corruption of incumbent* | 1.35 | 0.75 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| *Close to incumbent party* | 0.58 | 0.49 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *Close to opposition party* | 0.28 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Observations | 10,070 | | | |

Table A2: Summary Statistic of democracies

| | Mean | Standard Deviation | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 2.62 | 0.81 | 0.88 | 5.38 |
| Distance Afrobarometer to Diocese Border (in km) | 4.90 | 2.91 | 0.00 | 9.98 |
| Cath. Mission within 50 km | 0.33 | 0.59 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| Cath. Mission within 50 km in Neighboring Diocese | 0.12 | 0.43 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| Catholic today | 0.26 | 0.44 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Schooling Ordinal | 2.31 | 1.72 | 0.00 | 8.00 |
| Any Primary | 0.83 | 0.38 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Any Secondary | 0.47 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Skilled Labor | 0.23 | 0.42 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Index of political participation | 0.05 | 0.68 | -1.66 | 1.61 |
| *Voted* | 0.75 | 0.43 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *Contacted local gov. councilor* | 0.53 | 0.93 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| *Index of community engagement* | -0.02 | 0.91 | -1.70 | 1.45 |
| *Attend a community meeting* | 2.26 | 1.32 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Join others to raise an issue* | 1.89 | 1.32 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Index of political sophistication | 0.02 | 0.65 | -2.07 | 1.41 |
| *Employed* | 0.36 | 0.48 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *News consumption on radio* | 3.04 | 1.39 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Discuss politics with others* | 0.92 | 0.73 | 0.00 | 2.00 |
| Satisfaction with democracy | 2.49 | 1.06 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Support for democratic institutions | 2.77 | 0.74 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Index of incumbent evaluation and support | -0.02 | 0.78 | -2.29 | 1.73 |
| *Performance of incumbent* | 2.15 | 1.18 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Corruption of incumbent* | 1.27 | 0.75 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| *Close to incumbent party* | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *Close to opposition party* | 0.29 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Observations | 4,711 | | | |

## Table A3: Summary Statistic of open anocracies

| | Mean | Standard Deviation | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 1.71 | 0.89 | 0.00 | 5.24 |
| Distance Afrobarometer to Diocese Border (in km) | 4.32 | 3.12 | 0.00 | 9.93 |
| Cath. Mission within 50 km | 0.11 | 0.38 | 0.00 | 2.00 |
| Cath. Mission within 50 km in Neighboring Diocese | 0.13 | 0.37 | 0.00 | 2.00 |
| Catholic today | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Schooling Ordinal | 2.76 | 1.89 | 0.00 | 8.00 |
| Any Primary | 0.85 | 0.36 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Any Secondary | 0.56 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Skilled Labor | 0.24 | 0.43 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Index of political participation | -0.14 | 0.65 | -1.70 | 1.61 |
| *Voted* | 0.68 | 0.47 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *Contacted local gov. councilor* | 0.34 | 0.76 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| *Index of community engagement* | -0.17 | 0.91 | -1.70 | 1.45 |
| *Attend a community meeting* | 2.00 | 1.31 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Join others to raise an issue* | 1.77 | 1.27 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Index of political sophistication | 0.02 | 0.64 | -2.07 | 1.19 |
| *Employed* | 0.41 | 0.49 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *News consumption on radio* | 2.99 | 1.37 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Discuss politics with others* | 0.88 | 0.69 | 0.00 | 2.00 |
| Satisfaction with democracy | 2.08 | 0.99 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Support for democratic institutions | 2.65 | 0.71 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Index of incumbent evaluation and support | -0.15 | 0.87 | -2.29 | 1.73 |
| *Performance of incumbent* | 1.96 | 1.26 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Corruption of incumbent* | 1.44 | 0.80 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| *Close to incumbent party* | 0.57 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *Close to opposition party* | 0.25 | 0.43 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Observations | 1,445 | | | |

## Table A4: Summary Statistic of closed anocracies

| | Mean | Standard Deviation | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 2.91 | 1.08 | 0.04 | 5.27 |
| Distance Afrobarometer to Diocese Border (in km) | 5.12 | 3.03 | 0.00 | 9.97 |
| Cath. Mission within 50 km | 1.31 | 1.75 | 0.00 | 5.00 |
| Cath. Mission within 50 km in Neighboring Diocese | 0.47 | 1.01 | 0.00 | 5.00 |
| Catholic today | 0.28 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Schooling Ordinal | 2.74 | 1.93 | 0.00 | 8.00 |
| Any Primary | 0.86 | 0.34 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Any Secondary | 0.53 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Skilled Labor | 0.27 | 0.44 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Index of political participation | -0.07 | 0.69 | -1.66 | 1.61 |
| *Voted* | 0.72 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *Contacted local gov. councilor* | 0.50 | 0.91 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| *Index of community engagement* | -0.13 | 0.91 | -1.70 | 1.45 |
| *Attend a community meeting* | 2.01 | 1.32 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Join others to raise an issue* | 1.85 | 1.31 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Index of political sophistication | -0.00 | 0.65 | -1.67 | 1.19 |
| *Employed* | 0.41 | 0.49 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *News consumption on radio* | 2.86 | 1.52 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Discuss politics with others* | 0.89 | 0.72 | 0.00 | 2.00 |
| Satisfaction with democracy | 2.26 | 1.05 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Support for democratic institutions | 2.91 | 0.72 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Index of incumbent evaluation and support | -0.10 | 0.83 | -2.29 | 1.73 |
| *Performance of incumbent* | 2.10 | 1.21 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Corruption of incumbent* | 1.41 | 0.73 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| *Close to incumbent party* | 0.63 | 0.48 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *Close to opposition party* | 0.27 | 0.44 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Observations | 3,914 | | | |

Table A5: Classification of Countries in Sample

| Classification | Country |
|---|---|
| **Democracy** Polity2 >5 | Benin (2005, 2008, 2011, 2014) |
| | Botswana (2005, 2008, 2012, 2014) |
| | Burkina Faso∗ (2015) |
| | Burundi (2012, 2014) |
| | Cape Verde (2005, 2008, 2011, 2014) |
| | Ghana (2005, 2008, 2012, 2014) |
| | Kenya (2005, 2008, 2011, 2014) |
| | Lesotho (2005, 2008, 2012, 2014) |
| | Liberia (2008, 2012, 2015) |
| | Madagascar∗ (2005, 2008, 2014, 2015) |
| | Malawi (2005, 2008, 2012, 2014) |
| | Mali∗ (2005, 2008) |
| | Mauritius (2012, 2014) |
| | Namibia (2006, 2008, 2012, 2014) |
| | Niger (2013, 2015) |
| | Senegal (2005, 2008, 2013, 2014) |
| | Sierra Leone (2012, 2015) |
| | South Africa (2006, 2008, 2011, 2015) |
| | Tunisia (2013, 2015) |
| | Zambia∗ (2009, 2012, 2013, 2014) |
| **Open Anocracy** 6 >Polity2 >0 | Algeria (2013,2015) |
| | Cote d'Ivoire (2013, 2014) |
| | Gabon (2015) |
| | Guinea (2013, 2015) |
| | Madagascar∗ (2013) |
| | Mali∗ (2013, 2014) |
| | Mozambique (2005, 2008, 2012, 2015) |
| | Nigeria (2005, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) |
| | Zambia∗ (2005) |
| | Zimbabwe∗ (2009, 2012, 2014) |
| **Closed Anocracy** Polity2 <1 | Burkina Faso∗ (2008, 2012) |
| | Cameroon (2013, 2015) |
| | Egypt (2013, 2014) |
| | Mali∗ (2012) |
| | Morocco (2013, 2015) |
| | Sudan (2013, 2015) |
| | Swaziland (2013, 2015) |
| | Tanzania (2005, 2008, 2012, 2014) |
| | Togo (2012, 2014) |
| | Uganda (2005, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2015) |
| | Zimbabwe∗ (2005) |

*Notes:* This table shows whether a country falls under Democracy, Open Anocracy or Closed Anocracy according to its Politiy2 score. Countries marked with an $*$ belong to multiple categories depending on the year.

Table A6: Number of 1910 Diocese in Afrobarometer Sample by Country

| Country | Number of Diocese |
|---|---|
| South Africa | 14 |
| Tanzania | 10 |
| Nigeria | 6 |
| Madagascar | 6 |
| Kenya | 5 |
| Uganda | 5 |
| Zambia | 5 |
| Cameroon | 4 |
| Lesotho | 3 |
| Guinea | 3 |
| Namibia | 3 |
| Egypt | 3 |
| Algeria | 3 |
| Togo | 2 |
| Swaziland | 2 |
| Malawi | 2 |
| Botswana | 2 |
| Gabon | 2 |
| Morocco | 2 |
| Benin | 2 |
| Ghana | 2 |
| Mozambique | 2 |
| Mali | 1 |
| Liberia | 1 |
| Sierra Leone | 1 |
| Zimbabwe | 1 |
| Senegal | 1 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 1 |
| Burundi | 1 |
| Tunisia | 1 |

Table A7: Effect of Proximity to Diocese Headquarters on Modern-Day Schools per Grid Controlling for Population Density 1880

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Schools per Grid Cell | | | | |
| | 10km | 15km | 20km | 25km | 50km |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.354 | 2.695** | 2.321* | 3.557** | 2.816** |
| | (0.361) | (1.249) | (1.193) | (1.597) | (1.392) |
| Fixed effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Cluster | BS | BS | BS | BS | BS |
| Observations | 679 | 1,373 | 2,066 | 2,746 | 5,851 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.755 | 0.572 | 0.513 | 0.412 | 0.479 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using the specification in Equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, indices for geographic controls, and border fixed effects. An observation is a 0.1 × 0.1 degree grid cell. The sample excludes grid-cells within 5 km of dioceses' border circa 1910 and the diocese of Zanzibar. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

## A3.2 Effects for Index components

Table A8: Effect on voted, contacted local councilor, attended community meeting and raised issue

| **Panel A:** | *Dependent variable:* Voted | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.00103 | -0.0164 | 0.0348** | -0.00256 |
| | (0.00957) | (0.0111) | (0.0162) | (0.0160) |
| Observations | 9921 | 4643 | 1402 | 3876 |
| $R^2$ | 0.109 | 0.108 | 0.106 | 0.126 |
| **Panel B:** | *Dependent variable:* Contacted Local Councilor | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0371 | -0.0867** | 0.0717* | -0.00814 |
| | (0.0376) | (0.0346) | (0.0377) | (0.0380) |
| Observations | 9280 | 4403 | 1391 | 3486 |
| $R^2$ | 0.091 | 0.078 | 0.084 | 0.186 |
| **Panel C:** | *Dependent variable:* Attended Community Meeting | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0657 | -0.122 | 0.131** | -0.112** |
| | (0.0462) | (0.0906) | (0.0615) | (0.0477) |
| Observations | 9893 | 4629 | 1398 | 3866 |
| $R^2$ | 0.199 | 0.165 | 0.193 | 0.274 |
| **Panel D:** | *Dependent variable:* Raised Issue | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0342 | -0.152 | 0.105 | -0.124*** |
| | (0.0472) | (0.0924) | (0.0688) | (0.0397) |
| Observations | 9862 | 4614 | 1392 | 3856 |
| $R^2$ | 0.157 | 0.172 | 0.138 | 0.189 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using the specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border *circa* 1910. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A9: Effect on radio news consumption and discuss politics

| **Panel A:** | *Dependent variable:* Radio News Consumption | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0762* | 0.153** | 0.0613 | 0.0280 |
| | (0.0410) | (0.0672) | (0.0982) | (0.0827) |
| Observations | 9950 | 4646 | 1417 | 3887 |
| $R^2$ | 0.118 | 0.094 | 0.101 | 0.161 |
| **Panel B:** | *Dependent variable:* Discuss Politics | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0289 | 0.00355 | 0.0717** | 0.0320 |
| | (0.0182) | (0.0267) | (0.0315) | (0.0481) |
| Observations | 9852 | 4621 | 1383 | 3848 |
| $R^2$ | 0.063 | 0.057 | 0.097 | 0.098 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using the specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border *circa* 1910. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A10: Effect on incumbent performance and support

| **Panel A:** | *Dependent variable:* Incumbent Performance | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0835 | 0.0111 | -0.110 | -0.109** |
| | (0.0562) | (0.0640) | (0.0809) | (0.0441) |
| Observations | 9595 | 4478 | 1351 | 3766 |
| $R^2$ | 0.097 | 0.076 | 0.285 | 0.164 |
| **Panel B:** | *Dependent variable:* Close to Incumbent Party | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0721*** | -0.00570 | -0.123*** | -0.0935*** |
| | (0.0223) | (0.0303) | (0.0156) | (0.0187) |
| Observations | 4983 | 2608 | 708 | 1664 |
| $R^2$ | 0.147 | 0.185 | 0.221 | 0.175 |
| **Panel C:** | *Dependent variable:* Close to Opposition Party | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0331* | 0.0168 | 0.0639** | 0.0611*** |
| | (0.0168) | (0.0233) | (0.0302) | (0.0190) |
| Observations | 4983 | 2608 | 708 | 1664 |
| $R^2$ | 0.129 | 0.179 | 0.203 | 0.156 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using the specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border *circa* 1910. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

## A3.3 Additional Outcomes

Table A11: Effect on Attending Protests

| | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocarcies |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Head | -0.0117 | -0.0321 | -0.0298* | 0.0230 |
| | (0.0203) | (0.0317) | (0.0161) | (0.0312) |
| Closer to Diocese Head=1 × Distance to Border | 0.00329 | -0.00608 | 0.00909 | 0.0109 |
| | (0.00572) | (0.00691) | (0.0130) | (0.00888) |
| Distance to Border | -0.00433 | 0.00368 | -0.0195* | -0.00370 |
| | (0.00364) | (0.00535) | (0.0100) | (0.00628) |
| Observations | 9726 | 4555 | 1367 | 3804 |
| $R^2$ | 0.033 | 0.038 | 0.040 | 0.037 |
| Border FEs | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| AB Round FEs | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Country FEs | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Cluster | BORDER | BORDER | BORDER | BORDER |
| Mean of Outcome | 0.878 | 0.826 | 0.933 | 0.921 |
| SD of Outcome | 0.780 | 0.776 | 0.821 | 0.767 |
| Min of Outcome | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Max of Outcome | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using the specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border *circa* 1910. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A12: Effect on Vote Selling

| | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocarcies |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Head | -0.0636* | -0.0538 | -0.0859 | -0.0425 |
| | (0.0372) | (0.0445) | (0.0715) | (0.0468) |
| Closer to Diocese Head=1 × Distance to Border | -0.00440 | -0.00327 | -0.0137 | -0.00964 |
| | (0.00746) | (0.0127) | (0.0117) | (0.00817) |
| Distance to Border | 0.00910 | 0.0176 | 0.00457 | 0.00405 |
| | (0.00892) | (0.0124) | (0.0104) | (0.00792) |
| Observations | 5027 | 2270 | 741 | 2016 |
| $R^2$ | 0.122 | 0.155 | 0.111 | 0.149 |
| Border FEs | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| AB Round FEs | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Country FEs | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Cluster | BORDER | BORDER | BORDER | BORDER |
| Mean of Outcome | 0.359 | 0.308 | 0.301 | 0.438 |
| SD of Outcome | 0.794 | 0.757 | 0.690 | 0.861 |
| Min of Outcome | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Max of Outcome | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using the specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border *circa* 1910. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

## A3.4 Robustness

Table A13: Robustness: No North African Countries

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.498*** | 0.0547*** | 0.302*** | |
| | (0.171) | (0.0193) | (0.0830) | |
| Observations | 9402 | 9239 | 9280 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.755 | 0.102 | 0.244 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0278 | -0.0863* | 0.0804*** | -0.0534*** |
| | (0.0260) | (0.0448) | (0.0195) | (0.0184) |
| Observations | 9294 | 4652 | 1336 | 3306 |
| $R^2$ | 0.181 | 0.193 | 0.170 | 0.209 |
| **Panel C:** Index of Political Sophistication | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0587*** | 0.0852*** | 0.0743** | 0.0738*** |
| | (0.0180) | (0.0311) | (0.0359) | (0.0215) |
| Observations | 9297 | 4652 | 1339 | 3306 |
| $R^2$ | 0.126 | 0.132 | 0.148 | 0.159 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0792*** | 0.0451 | 0.0697* | 0.0748*** |
| | (0.0189) | (0.0387) | (0.0347) | (0.00871) |
| Observations | 9243 | 4625 | 1326 | 3292 |
| $R^2$ | 0.074 | 0.065 | 0.121 | 0.069 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.123** | -0.0226 | -0.0933*** | -0.121*** |
| | (0.0522) | (0.0325) | (0.0244) | (0.0229) |
| Observations | 8380 | 4245 | 1174 | 2961 |
| $R^2$ | 0.121 | 0.088 | 0.085 | 0.226 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0840** | -0.0180 | -0.104* | -0.0831*** |
| | (0.0393) | (0.0525) | (0.0543) | (0.0225) |
| Observations | 9052 | 4552 | 1296 | 3204 |
| $R^2$ | 0.085 | 0.086 | 0.209 | 0.131 |

## Table A14: Robustness: No Kingdoms

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.507*** | 0.0445** | 0.265*** | |
| | (0.172) | (0.0185) | (0.0883) | |
| Observations | 8615 | 8305 | 8499 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.747 | 0.122 | 0.242 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0140 | -0.0387 | 0.0814*** | -0.0599*** |
| | (0.0247) | (0.0323) | (0.0189) | (0.0172) |
| Observations | 8515 | 3558 | 1418 | 3539 |
| $R^2$ | 0.201 | 0.191 | 0.173 | 0.256 |
| **Panel C:** Index of Political Sophistication | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0384** | 0.0597** | 0.0741** | 0.0301 |
| | (0.0181) | (0.0223) | (0.0353) | (0.0483) |
| Observations | 8518 | 3558 | 1421 | 3539 |
| $R^2$ | 0.139 | 0.150 | 0.145 | 0.161 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0584*** | 0.00861 | 0.0646* | 0.0453 |
| | (0.0212) | (0.0218) | (0.0363) | (0.0272) |
| Observations | 8454 | 3532 | 1407 | 3515 |
| $R^2$ | 0.084 | 0.089 | 0.118 | 0.072 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.116** | -0.0276 | -0.0928*** | -0.0969** |
| | (0.0559) | (0.0421) | (0.0237) | (0.0402) |
| Observations | 7685 | 3240 | 1248 | 3197 |
| $R^2$ | 0.132 | 0.085 | 0.097 | 0.222 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.110*** | -0.0588 | -0.110** | -0.108*** |
| | (0.0352) | (0.0406) | (0.0534) | (0.0316) |
| Observations | 8309 | 3505 | 1376 | 3428 |
| $R^2$ | 0.100 | 0.090 | 0.220 | 0.169 |

## Table A15: Robustness: No Islands

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.466*** | 0.0512*** | 0.269*** | |
| | (0.167) | (0.0190) | (0.0830) | |
| Observations | 9770 | 9450 | 9648 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.757 | 0.118 | 0.231 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0268 | -0.0860* | 0.0792*** | -0.0486** |
| | (0.0246) | (0.0454) | (0.0191) | (0.0196) |
| Observations | 9663 | 4432 | 1340 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.206 | 0.198 | 0.170 | 0.250 |
| **Panel C:** Index of Political Sophistication | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0421** | 0.0799** | 0.0712* | 0.0302 |
| | (0.0192) | (0.0324) | (0.0343) | (0.0451) |
| Observations | 9666 | 4432 | 1343 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.131 | 0.132 | 0.136 | 0.159 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0717*** | 0.0501 | 0.0617 | 0.0496* |
| | (0.0205) | (0.0399) | (0.0374) | (0.0250) |
| Observations | 9613 | 4411 | 1335 | 3867 |
| $R^2$ | 0.066 | 0.062 | 0.119 | 0.066 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.109** | -0.0228 | -0.0891*** | -0.0907** |
| | (0.0538) | (0.0334) | (0.0225) | (0.0405) |
| Observations | 8786 | 4081 | 1207 | 3498 |
| $R^2$ | 0.111 | 0.073 | 0.093 | 0.198 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0931** | -0.0185 | -0.109* | -0.109*** |
| | (0.0372) | (0.0542) | (0.0539) | (0.0287) |
| Observations | 9420 | 4338 | 1307 | 3775 |
| $R^2$ | 0.090 | 0.084 | 0.212 | 0.155 |

Table A16: Robustness: Controlling for Distance to Capital and Malaria Index

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.465*** | 0.0329 | 0.0822 | |
| | (0.164) | (0.0235) | (0.0696) | |
| Observations | 10070 | 9730 | 9929 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.755 | 0.121 | 0.240 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.000603 | -0.0574* | 0.0741*** | -0.00448 |
| | (0.0175) | (0.0334) | (0.0266) | (0.0210) |
| Observations | 9945 | 4636 | 1418 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.204 | 0.195 | 0.174 | 0.251 |
| **Panel C:** Index of Political Sophistication | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0316 | 0.0667** | 0.0447* | -0.0178 |
| | (0.0238) | (0.0247) | (0.0234) | (0.0334) |
| Observations | 9948 | 4636 | 1421 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.130 | 0.132 | 0.153 | 0.166 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0189 | 0.0133 | 0.0421 | -0.0141 |
| | (0.0176) | (0.0221) | (0.0376) | (0.0320) |
| Observations | 9883 | 4609 | 1407 | 3867 |
| $R^2$ | 0.076 | 0.068 | 0.123 | 0.073 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0250 | 0.0186 | -0.0874*** | -0.0247 |
| | (0.0224) | (0.0322) | (0.0269) | (0.0533) |
| Observations | 8975 | 4229 | 1248 | 3498 |
| $R^2$ | 0.119 | 0.091 | 0.099 | 0.200 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0677* | -0.0169 | -0.0734* | -0.0737 |
| | (0.0356) | (0.0440) | (0.0406) | (0.0449) |
| Observations | 9687 | 4536 | 1376 | 3775 |
| $R^2$ | 0.092 | 0.088 | 0.230 | 0.156 |

Table A17: Robustness: Drop 95 percentile in distance to DH (581 km)

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.552*** | 0.0606*** | 0.291*** | |
| | (0.170) | (0.0195) | (0.0920) | |
| Observations | 9582 | 9267 | 9461 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.770 | 0.121 | 0.235 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0319 | -0.104** | 0.0738*** | -0.0528*** |
| | (0.0269) | (0.0491) | (0.0243) | (0.0186) |
| Observations | 9478 | 4436 | 1190 | 3852 |
| $R^2$ | 0.206 | 0.194 | 0.171 | 0.249 |
| **Panel C:** Index of Political Sophistication | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0403** | 0.0766** | 0.0568** | 0.0322 |
| | (0.0201) | (0.0344) | (0.0255) | (0.0479) |
| Observations | 9478 | 4436 | 1190 | 3852 |
| $R^2$ | 0.133 | 0.136 | 0.164 | 0.158 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0757*** | 0.0563 | 0.0594 | 0.0505* |
| | (0.0209) | (0.0394) | (0.0435) | (0.0265) |
| Observations | 9414 | 4409 | 1177 | 3828 |
| $R^2$ | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.119 | 0.066 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.121** | -0.0357 | -0.112*** | -0.0878** |
| | (0.0578) | (0.0366) | (0.0323) | (0.0417) |
| Observations | 8556 | 4038 | 1051 | 3467 |
| $R^2$ | 0.116 | 0.091 | 0.108 | 0.199 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0908** | -0.0125 | -0.107** | -0.110*** |
| | (0.0404) | (0.0649) | (0.0432) | (0.0319) |
| Observations | 9224 | 4336 | 1150 | 3738 |
| $R^2$ | 0.090 | 0.084 | 0.236 | 0.157 |

## Table A18: Robustness: 5 km Bandwidth

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.363*** | 0.0514** | 0.222*** | |
| | (0.122) | (0.0236) | (0.0596) | |
| Observations | 4619 | 4464 | 4571 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.710 | 0.127 | 0.251 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0441 | -0.109*** | 0.105*** | -0.102*** |
| | (0.0306) | (0.0258) | (0.0209) | (0.0253) |
| Observations | 4580 | 2207 | 748 | 1625 |
| $R^2$ | 0.223 | 0.226 | 0.192 | 0.292 |
| **Panel C:** Index of Political Sophistication | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0421* | 0.0832 | 0.0919*** | 0.0413 |
| | (0.0214) | (0.0497) | (0.0284) | (0.0458) |
| Observations | 4580 | 2207 | 748 | 1625 |
| $R^2$ | 0.106 | 0.104 | 0.139 | 0.157 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0821*** | 0.0402 | 0.0822 | 0.0551 |
| | (0.0284) | (0.0449) | (0.0487) | (0.0379) |
| Observations | 4553 | 2194 | 738 | 1621 |
| $R^2$ | 0.081 | 0.052 | 0.131 | 0.089 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.152* | -0.0591 | -0.139** | -0.129* |
| | (0.0769) | (0.0426) | (0.0644) | (0.0626) |
| Observations | 4140 | 1988 | 682 | 1470 |
| $R^2$ | 0.116 | 0.116 | 0.125 | 0.218 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.134** | -0.0964 | -0.119 | -0.143** |
| | (0.0520) | (0.0831) | (0.0716) | (0.0579) |
| Observations | 4451 | 2158 | 720 | 1573 |
| $R^2$ | 0.102 | 0.100 | 0.226 | 0.160 |

## Table A19: Robustness: 15 km Bandwidth

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.542*** | 0.0419** | 0.313*** | |
| | (0.201) | (0.0176) | (0.0893) | |
| Observations | 13764 | 13359 | 13602 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.758 | 0.113 | 0.243 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0425* | -0.0970*** | 0.0778*** | -0.0672*** |
| | (0.0233) | (0.0359) | (0.0222) | (0.0130) |
| Observations | 13626 | 6528 | 1755 | 5343 |
| $R^2$ | 0.197 | 0.193 | 0.180 | 0.230 |
| **Panel C:** Index of Political Sophistication | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0428** | 0.0747** | 0.0411 | 0.0444 |
| | (0.0180) | (0.0324) | (0.0309) | (0.0349) |
| Observations | 13629 | 6528 | 1758 | 5343 |
| $R^2$ | 0.135 | 0.140 | 0.131 | 0.160 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0771*** | 0.0573* | 0.0547* | 0.0695*** |
| | (0.0198) | (0.0327) | (0.0313) | (0.0197) |
| Observations | 13533 | 6485 | 1739 | 5309 |
| $R^2$ | 0.064 | 0.060 | 0.122 | 0.068 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.129*** | -0.0239 | -0.0884*** | -0.129*** |
| | (0.0426) | (0.0276) | (0.0292) | (0.0334) |
| Observations | 12274 | 5948 | 1556 | 4770 |
| $R^2$ | 0.113 | 0.093 | 0.105 | 0.201 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.118*** | -0.0442 | -0.108* | -0.125*** |
| | (0.0369) | (0.0599) | (0.0551) | (0.0231) |
| Observations | 13308 | 6403 | 1711 | 5194 |
| $R^2$ | 0.087 | 0.082 | 0.225 | 0.145 |

## Table A20: Robustness: 20 km Bandwidth

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.482** | 0.0295 | 0.277*** | |
| | (0.195) | (0.0209) | (0.0873) | |
| Observations | 19313 | 18733 | 19067 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.730 | 0.111 | 0.269 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0222 | -0.0643** | 0.0551* | -0.0545*** |
| | (0.0235) | (0.0279) | (0.0274) | (0.0160) |
| Observations | 19102 | 9844 | 2441 | 6817 |
| $R^2$ | 0.195 | 0.187 | 0.179 | 0.220 |
| **Panel C:** Index of Political Sophistication | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0371** | 0.0734** | 0.0272 | 0.0448 |
| | (0.0182) | (0.0304) | (0.0251) | (0.0293) |
| Observations | 19107 | 9844 | 2446 | 6817 |
| $R^2$ | 0.137 | 0.150 | 0.125 | 0.153 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0628*** | 0.0411 | 0.0459 | 0.0588** |
| | (0.0197) | (0.0295) | (0.0321) | (0.0224) |
| Observations | 18966 | 9786 | 2411 | 6769 |
| $R^2$ | 0.059 | 0.053 | 0.109 | 0.073 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.102** | -0.00796 | -0.106*** | -0.112*** |
| | (0.0488) | (0.0369) | (0.0310) | (0.0307) |
| Observations | 17195 | 8963 | 2177 | 6054 |
| $R^2$ | 0.105 | 0.083 | 0.107 | 0.199 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.124*** | -0.0555 | -0.156** | -0.106*** |
| | (0.0357) | (0.0521) | (0.0623) | (0.0211) |
| Observations | 18649 | 9655 | 2387 | 6607 |
| $R^2$ | 0.088 | 0.100 | 0.201 | 0.132 |

## Table A21: Robustness: 25 km Bandwidth

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.533** | 0.0275 | 0.264*** | |
| | (0.224) | (0.0169) | (0.0846) | |
| Observations | 22968 | 22313 | 22677 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.692 | 0.109 | 0.272 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0119 | -0.0448* | 0.0589* | -0.0452*** |
| | (0.0232) | (0.0227) | (0.0300) | (0.0116) |
| Observations | 22718 | 11814 | 3102 | 7802 |
| $R^2$ | 0.188 | 0.175 | 0.178 | 0.212 |
| **Panel C:** Index of Political Sophistication | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0377** | 0.0563* | 0.0237 | 0.0594** |
| | (0.0183) | (0.0293) | (0.0227) | (0.0258) |
| Observations | 22723 | 11814 | 3107 | 7802 |
| $R^2$ | 0.138 | 0.152 | 0.129 | 0.149 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0677*** | 0.0400 | 0.0707** | 0.0580*** |
| | (0.0181) | (0.0277) | (0.0298) | (0.0193) |
| Observations | 22544 | 11742 | 3052 | 7750 |
| $R^2$ | 0.059 | 0.053 | 0.106 | 0.065 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0913* | 0.00497 | -0.0947** | -0.127*** |
| | (0.0496) | (0.0525) | (0.0363) | (0.0269) |
| Observations | 20436 | 10740 | 2775 | 6921 |
| $R^2$ | 0.101 | 0.080 | 0.086 | 0.200 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.120*** | -0.0521 | -0.171** | -0.108*** |
| | (0.0294) | (0.0521) | (0.0660) | (0.0184) |
| Observations | 22203 | 11587 | 3039 | 7577 |
| $R^2$ | 0.081 | 0.100 | 0.168 | 0.125 |

## Table A22: Robustness: 50 km Bandwidth

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious Identification, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.415*** | 0.0122 | 0.205*** | |
| | (0.158) | (0.0105) | (0.0686) | |
| Observations | 46657 | 45507 | 46152 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.604 | 0.108 | 0.254 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0241 | -0.0384** | 0.00896 | -0.0516*** |
| | (0.0155) | (0.0156) | (0.0475) | (0.00898) |
| Observations | 46222 | 25625 | 6541 | 14056 |
| $R^2$ | 0.185 | 0.181 | 0.177 | 0.206 |
| **Panel C:** Index of Political Sophistication | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0104 | 0.0161 | -0.00138 | 0.0259 |
| | (0.0132) | (0.0233) | (0.0169) | (0.0190) |
| Observations | 46232 | 25628 | 6546 | 14058 |
| $R^2$ | 0.128 | 0.132 | 0.149 | 0.141 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0411*** | 0.0317** | 0.0374 | 0.0293* |
| | (0.0140) | (0.0158) | (0.0445) | (0.0171) |
| Observations | 45939 | 25505 | 6451 | 13983 |
| $R^2$ | 0.058 | 0.061 | 0.089 | 0.061 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0697** | -0.00647 | -0.131* | -0.108*** |
| | (0.0317) | (0.0263) | (0.0665) | (0.0250) |
| Observations | 41694 | 23549 | 5907 | 12238 |
| $R^2$ | 0.100 | 0.072 | 0.087 | 0.187 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0862*** | -0.0110 | -0.202*** | -0.0996*** |
| | (0.0268) | (0.0262) | (0.0720) | (0.0241) |
| Observations | 45301 | 25200 | 6397 | 13704 |
| $R^2$ | 0.072 | 0.082 | 0.182 | 0.116 |

Table A23: Covariate Balance—Country-Level Variables

| | Democracies | | Open Anocracies | | Closed Anocracies | | P-value | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Covariates (country level)** | **N** | **Mean** | **N** | **Mean** | **N** | **Mean** | **D. vs. O-A.** | **D. vs. C-A.** | **O-A. vs. C-A.** |
| Historical Centralization | 17 | 0.21 | 10 | 0.15 | 11 | 0.23 | 0.59 | 0.86 | 0.49 |
| Year of Independence | 20 | 1955 | 10 | 1964 | 11 | 1959 | 0.24 | 0.66 | 0.32 |
| Violent Independence? | 20 | 0.25 | 10 | 0.3 | 11 | 0.27 | 0.79 | 0.90 | 0.90 |
| Slave Exports | 20 | 195,801 | 10 | 413,393 | 11 | 251,987 | 0.34 | 0.68 | 0.49 |
| Population in 1400 | 20 | 448,714 | 10 | 1,144,463 | 11 | 1,441,215 | 0.24 | 0.04 | 0.67 |
| Log Settler Mortality | 14 | 5.45 | 7 | 6.36 | 9 | 5.57 | 0.14 | 0.84 | 0.21 |
| British Colony | 20 | 0.5 | 10 | 0.3 | 11 | 0.55 | 0.31 | 0.82 | 0.28 |
| British Legal Origins | 20 | 0.5 | 10 | 0.3 | 11 | 0.45 | 0.31 | 0.82 | 0.49 |
| Settler Colony | 20 | 0.2 | 10 | 0.4 | 11 | 0.09 | 0.30 | 0.41 | 0.12 |
| Colonial Railroads (km) | 20 | 579 | 10 | 1,147 | 11 | 1,088 | 0.17 | 0.28 | 0.91 |
| Gemstones | 20 | 22,475 | 10 | 1,420 | 11 | 942 | 0.11 | 0.10* | 0.66 |
| Soil Quality | 20 | 34.53 | 10 | 32.45 | 11 | 35.07 | 0.79 | 0.94 | 0.77 |
| Average Distance to Coast | 20 | 26.21 | 10 | 16.46 | 11 | 12.30 | 0.32 | 0.11 | 0.58 |
| Land area (1000 Ha) | 20 | 41,346 | 10 | 78,323 | 11 | 66,530 | 0.13 | 0.29 | 0.69 |
| Ruggedness | 20 | 1.01 | 10 | 0.57 | 11 | 0.96 | 0.19 | 0.91 | 0.22 |
| Oil Production in 2000 | 20 | 220 | 10 | 17,046 | 11 | 4,561 | 0.18 | 0.21 | 0.32 |
| Malaria Suitability | 18 | 11.47 | 10 | 12.28 | 11 | 10.70 | 0.80 | 0.84 | 0.68 |
| Rule of Law | 20 | -0.38 | 10 | -0.86 | 11 | -0.62 | 0.02** | 0.31 | 0.19 |
| GDP 1950 | 20 | 956 | 10 | 1,047 | 11 | 718 | 0.76 | 0.19 | 0.24 |
| Failed State Index 2006 | 17 | 76.45 | 9 | 87.99 | 10 | 90.1 | 0.09* | 0.02** | 0.75 |
| Taxes as % of GDP 2010 | 14 | 17.39 | 6 | 12.78 | 8 | 13.61 | 0.04** | 0.14 | 0.71 |
| Political Decentralization | 13 | 2.05 | 8 | 2.21 | 6 | 1.94 | 0.71 | 0.84 | 0.57 |